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Notes
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE
EVIDENCE
In the recent case of Pulitzer v. Chapman' suit was brought in
the Circuit Court of St. Louis to contest a will on the grounds of
undue influence and fraud. The jury sustained the will, but the
Court granted a new trial, assigning as its reasons that the ver-
dict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence on the
issue as to undue influence, and that there had been error con-
cerning two instructions, neither of which is relevant to the
ensuing discussion. The question of evidence pertinent to the
issue of undue influence related to the effect of certain statements
contained in a prior deposition taken in the same case from the
will scrivener, as witness for the proponents, which statements
were inconsistent with certain of his later testimony at the trial.
These statements represented the only substantial evidence of
undue influence in the case, but they were sufficient, if admissible
as substantive proof, to sustain the order of the Circuit Court
concerning the verdict of the jury.2 After the witness had testi-
fied directly for the proponents, the contestants, during the cross-
examination, read to him the identical questions and inconsistent
answers contained in the prior deposition, and upon interroga-
tion, he admitted having made such answers to the very ques-
tions. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, it was urged
by the defendant-proponent-appellant that the above-mentioned
statements were admissible only for purposes of impeachment,
and not as substantive evidence of the facts contained, therein,
and it was contended by the plaintiff-contestant-respondent that
such statements were admissible for both purposes. The Supreme
Court, expressly negativing an intention to announce a general
I (Mo. 1935) 85 S. W. (2nd) 400.
2n Mo. where there has been an order granting a new trial because the
verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, the appellate
court can interfere only where it finds that no verdict for the respondent
would be allowed to stand i. e. the inquiry is limited to whether there was
any substantial evidence to sustain the action of the trial court. Security
Bank of Elvins v. Nat'l Surety Co. (1933) 330 Mo. 340, 344, 62 S. W. (2nd)
'708, 709, and cases there cited.
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